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After a brief introduction, this article analyses in its second sec-
tion the roles that the public and private sectors should play un-
der a housing and housing finance policy in which the function
of the State is to facilitate the development of the sector while
occupying a subsidiary position with respect to private enter-
prise. It examines the role of direct housing subsidies within
such a policy, as a means of creating effective demand for the
supply of housing generated by the private sector on market
terms, with special attention to the attributes of such subsidies,
and it highlights the catalytic role that such a system can play in
promoting saving. Section III summarizes the Latin American
experience with respect to direct housing subsidy schemes, de-
scribes their main features, advantages and limitations, and de-
tails the reforms made or proposed, especially in the
programmes with the longest history. Finally, section IV sets
forth the main lessons to be learned from the Latin American
experience, with special emphasis on the conditions and charac-




In Latin America and the Caribbean, the quantitative
housing deficit –defined as the difference between the
number of households and the number of permanent
dwellings– amounted in 1995 to 28 million units, while
the qualitative deficit –defined as the number of perma-
nent dwellings which are not satisfactory because they
lack certain services– came to nearly 26 million of the
existing dwellings (ECLAC, 1995). Since the region has
some 118 million households, this means that one out
of every four Latin American households does not have
a dwelling, and if we add to this figure the number of
housing units which require some type of rehabilita-
tion, we see that almost half the households in the re-
gion are living in unsatisfactory conditions.
This statistical finding highlights not only the
magnitude of the housing deficit, which affects all
the countries of the region, but also the ineffective-
ness of the housing and housing finance policies ap-
plied in the past. Furthermore, this heavy housing
deficit is concentrated to a large extent in the lowest-
income segment of the population, which, although it
represents a significant potential demand, has no real
possibilities of achieving a suitable housing solution,
mainly because of their difficulty in gaining access
to finance on appropriate terms due to their lack of
sufficient purchasing power, their inability to pro-
vide satisfactory collateral for mortgage loans, and
their impossibility of attesting to a stable income.
In order to improve the access of the lowest-
income sectors to housing, it is necessary to make
innovations in the finance policies and instruments in
force in this field. This article explores ways of help-
ing to give such sectors suitable purchasing power:
that is, creating an effective demand for housing
among them, and makes a conceptual and compara-
tive analysis of the Latin American experience in the
application of direct housing subsidies (hereafter
“DHS”) for the lowest-income sectors.
II
The economic rationale of
direct housing subsidies
1. Housing policy and the roles of the public
and private sectors 1
The housing and housing finance policies applied in
the past in Latin America were marked by predomi-
nant State intervention, with only very limited partic-
ipation by the formal private sector. Under such
policies, the State over-regulated the operation of the
markets and agents involved –by establishing ceil-
ings for the interest rates charged by housing finance
systems, for example– and played a direct role in
building and financing dwellings, usually by offering
loans at subsidized interest rates or subsidizing the
prices of the dwellings.
The results were thoroughly counter-productive,
as is clearly reflected in the enormous housing defi-
cits accumulated in the region. On the one hand,
these housing construction and finance schemes did
not meet the aspirations of private housing builders
and financial intermediaries in terms of rates of
profit. On the other hand, the active role played by
the State as a builder of houses bureaucratically de-
fined the characteristics and prices of the latter and
the arrangements for allocating them, thus eliminat-
ing the functioning of the market mechanisms for
the range of dwellings supposedly intended for the
lowest-income sectors and thereby driving away pri-
vate builders.
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1 For a more detailed analysis of these matters, see Gonzales
Arrieta (1995).
Such policies also meant that the credit intended
for the building and acquisition of dwellings was in-
sufficient to cover the needs of the region (Zawadzki,
1993, p. 33). In addition, there were the unsuitable
terms of access for people of low purchasing power.
Together, these factors limited the size and stability
of effective demand for housing and mortgage loans.
As a result, private builders and financial intermedi-
aries concentrated on serving the demand of the
higher-income sectors, giving rise to a doubly per-
verse effect: on the one hand, the reduction of formal
markets and growing inhibition of private investment
in the housing sector, and on the other, the increasing
prevalence of informal forms of housing construction
and finance, which now mobilize a considerable vol-
ume of resources in the region (ECLAC, 1996, p. 119).
In some Latin American countries, housing and
housing finance policies have registered substantial
results, with annual housing production exceeding
the new demand generated each year by natural pop-
ulation growth and the formation of new households.
These countries have thus begun to reduce the accu-
mulated housing deficit.
The housing and housing finance policy models
behind such results have as their common denomina-
tor a clear political will to apply a market-based sec-
toral development model which is compatible with
the general economic and social development
scheme and is of an integral nature: i.e., provided
with the instruments and resources needed to cover
the housing requirements of all income-levels.
Such a model recognizes that the State alone is
incapable of solving the housing deficit, so that State
action must be such as to stimulate private invest-
ment. This recognition of the complementary nature
of the efforts needed calls for fundamental innova-
tions in public policy, in the instruments applied and
the institutional schemes adopted. The traditional
role of the State is replaced by the role of a facilita-
tor, designed to provide incentives in terms of the re-
covery of costs, profit levels and stability so that the
housing sector can compete with the other sectors of
the economy and private investment can play a major
role in housing construction and finance.
The foregoing is based on the assumption that
dealing with housing needs is primarily an economic
operation that has repercussions on social welfare
policy. The multiplier effects of the housing sector
on economic activity and employment are just as im-
portant as those of other economic sectors, if not
more so: every dollar invested in housing generates a
further two dollars of economic activity in other sec-
tors, and every additional job in housing construction
gives rise to two others in related activities (Mayo
and Angel, 1993, p. 34).
The prevalence of conditions of profitability and
competitiveness in the real estate and housing fi-
nance markets makes it possible, firstly, for the pri-
vate sector to view the housing construction industry
as a business option capable of competing on an
equal footing with other sectors of the economy; sec-
ondly, for the savings mobilized to the housing sector
to obtain positive real levels of profitability; thirdly,
for mortgage loans to be recovered in real terms, thus
making long-term housing finance a sustainable ven-
ture, and fourthly, for financial intermediaries to find
a profitable business option in housing finance too.
However, while this model recognizes that pri-
vate investment in the housing sector will only be vi-
able if market conditions apply in the construction
and financing of dwellings, it also has to be admitted
that the market mechanisms do not give access to
housing to those sectors of the population which do
not have sufficient purchasing and payment capacity.
The State must therefore also assume a subsidiary
role designed to ensure equality of opportunities so
that all families, whatever their economic position,
will have the possibility of solving their housing
problems through the market and obtaining a hous-
ing solution in keeping with their own efforts and
economic possibilities. This is the context for the use
of direct housing subsidies (“DHS”) which, in con-
junction with the efforts of the families themselves
and mortgage loans on market terms, will serve to
make up the capacity for the purchase of dwellings
built by the private sector for the lowest-income sec-
tors.
2. Creation of effective demand for housing
through direct housing subsidies
In general terms, DHS are an explicit, once-only,
non-repayable contribution given by the State to
families that comply with certain established require-
ments in order to provide them with a purchasing
power greater than that afforded by their own in-
come. It is thus a demand subsidy, not a subsidy for
supply.
The insufficient purchasing power of broad sec-
tors of the population prevents the enormous poten-
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tial demand which exists from being turned into
effective demand which would stimulate investment
and private housing supply. The creation of purchas-
ing power in the poorest sectors would therefore lay
the foundations for more sustained growth of activity
in the housing sector.
Numerous favourable effects can be expected
from DHS (Domínguez, 1994b). Thus, they expand
the potential real estate market by creating effective
capacity for the purchase of private housing supply
and at the same time reduce the risks of housing con-
struction, since if private builders can be sure that
there will be demand backed up by purchasing
power, they will likewise be sure they can sell their
houses and the housing supply will be more stable in
the medium term: in a climate of free competition
this will lead to an improvement in the quality and a
reduction in the price of dwellings. DHS also stimu-
late an increase in the potential market of persons
seeking mortgage loans, since by reducing the
amount of indebtedness needed to make up the price
of a dwelling they mean that, without requiring an
increase in their income, recipient families will be-
come eligible for mortgage loans in keeping with
their payment capacity. Such subsidies also give rise
to a better-quality loan portfolio, since the debtors
are assuming obligations that it will be easier for
them to pay, while the coverage of the mortgage
guarantee will provide a surplus over the debt (equiv-
alent to the amount of the subsidy) which will be
greater than the average for the portfolio.
DHS also represent the abolition of the traditional
paternalistic attitude taken by the State when dealing
with the neediest groups, replacing it with an ap-
proach that stimulates and complements the efforts
of the families themselves, on the basis of objective
and impersonal procedures. They thus strengthen the
links between citizens and the State, exploit the ad-
vantages of the market economy, and allow benefi-
ciaries to choose the solution best fitting their needs.
By turning the potential demand for housing into
effective demand and furthering the functioning of
the market economy, DHS stimulate a bigger supply
of dwellings and of housing finance, which can facil-
itate the access of the population sectors with the
least resources and make an effective contribution to
reducing the housing deficit. These subsidies, which
in the final analysis are a contribution by the State
that forms part of the growing transfer to the private
sector of the leading role in housing finance, have
thus shown themselves to be a much more effective
means of State intervention.
Why are DHS to be preferred as a means of deal-
ing with the housing needs of the poorest sectors?
Firstly, such subsidies are more equitable, since they
make it possible to target the efforts more precisely
on the population it is desired to benefit, and they are
also progressive, because the lower the cost of the
dwelling, the higher the corresponding subsidy. In
contrast, indirect subsidies through the interest rates
on housing loans are highly regressive, because in
the absence of a system of allocating loans by prices,
the mechanism that prevails is the rationing of the
available resources: in this context, those who have
most access to the available finance are usually the
sectors with most influence or the greatest payment
capacity. Such an indirect subsidy is also very in-
equitable: not only does it not reach the people who
need it most, but also those who obtain most credit
automatically obtain a bigger contribution from the
State.
A second argument in favour of DHS is their
greater efficiency. Interest rate subsidies distort the
operation of housing finance systems because they
do not ensure that the resources loaned will be recov-
ered in real terms, thus leading to the decapitalization
of the financial intermediaries and causing housing
finance to diminish or disappear. In contrast, DHS are
complementary to mortgage loans on market terms
and do not displace them: the counterpart of direct
housing subsidies should be a loan operation on
those terms. Consequently, DHS are perfectly com-
patible with a housing finance system with positive
real interest rates on both savings and loans.
The inefficiency of interest rate subsidies is also
reflected in the fact that the State is unable to mea-
sure the amount of resources granted in the form of
subsidies in a clear and transparent manner and, still
worse, the beneficiaries do not have a full perception
of the benefits they are receiving. In contrast, DHS
can not only be measured precisely in order to deter-
mine the amount of fiscal expenditure involved but
also –by stimulating family efforts as a requirement
for becoming eligible for the subsidy– they give
beneficiaries a real awareness of the benefits they
receive.
Another argument in favour of DHS is that they
involve a smaller administrative burden for the State
and hence also a greater saving of fiscal resources. In
this type of subsidy, the State’s activities are limited
to laying down the corresponding regulations, invit-
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ing applications, processing and selecting the appli-
cations received, and paying out the subsidies where
appropriate. It does not take on long-term adminis-
trative commitments, as it does in the case of hous-
ing loans at subsidized interest rates. In this latter
case, the administrative costs of recovering a loan
portfolio which has deteriorated in real terms over
time represent a growing burden with respect to the
value recovered. It may be noted that the efficiency
and efficacy of public spending made possible by the
application of a system such as DHS will strengthen
the amount set aside for this purpose each year in the
public budget. Moreover, if DHS make possible a
higher level of activity in the housing and related
sectors, the State will be able to recover part or all of
its outlays in this respect through the taxes generated
by this greater activity.
In short, it may be categorically asserted that
DHS are in no way incompatible with the market
economy model, since this is an accurately targeted
(non-discriminatory) system of finance which makes
it possible to effectively reach the population that it
is desired to benefit; it is a transparent and accurately
measurable (non-hidden) system, both for the State
(which knows who it is benefitting, and by how
much) and for the beneficiaries (who know how
much they are receiving); it does not give rise to dis-
tortions in the financial system, as subsidized interest
rates do; and it does not displace the private sector
from the housing market but, on the contrary, attracts
it by turning potential housing demand into effective
demand.
3. The importance of prior saving and its links
with direct housing subsidies
Housing is perhaps the most important durable phys-
ical asset of most families, and its price is several
times their annual income. The acquisition of a
dwelling is normally only feasible through a
long-term loan. This purchase is an important incen-
tive for the family to save, postponing present con-
sumption for the benefit of future consumption. In
the developed countries, family savings deposited in
formal financial institutions are an important source
of funds for housing loans (AID, 1987). DHS can
serve as an important catalyst for the formation of
family savings channeled through the formal finan-
cial system.
DHS seeks to stimulate families to make an effort
to save in order to gain access to a dwelling, and the
typical expression of this effort should be the me-
thodical accumulation of prior savings to supplement
the direct subsidy and, when applicable, long-term
mortgage loans.
No matter how small it is, prior saving is per-
haps the most powerful basis for establishing a
transparent and objective system of ranking appli-
cants for DHS, which should be designed to reward
the amount saved and the duration, permanence and
methodical nature of the prior saving process. Fur-
thermore, the prior saving requirement is a much eas-
ier and less costly criterion to manage and control
than, for example, one based on income level. Natu-
rally, the prior saving required for requesting and ob-
taining a DHS must be in keeping with the family
income level, the price of the desired dwelling and
the number of dependants, among other factors, in
order to ensure that State aid goes primarily to the
families with the lowest income. It is known from
experience that the effort made by families wishing
to receive a DHS should not necessarily be expressed
in terms of monetary saving. It may also be useful,
especially in the case of the lowest-income strata, to
accept contributions in kind (such as land, materials
or labour). The important thing is to get across the
idea that DHS is a reward for family effort, not just a
handout.
The available data also show that DHS have
served to stimulate the formation of saving for hous-
ing which is channelled through the formal financial
system (Domínguez, 1994a). In order for this to take
place, there must be a favourable macroeconomic cli-
mate and the saving must have a positive yield in real
terms over time. In inflationary situations like those
which have prevailed in the recent past, housing sav-
ings in money, deposited in financial systems, have
tended to be replaced by housing savings in the form
of the acquisition of building sites and materials,
which better fulfilled the role of a value refuge over
time. Savings in the financial system must be assets
which are both sufficiently liquid (subject of course
to certain restrictions, in view of their methodical
and contractual nature) and also secure. This latter
requirement may be strengthened through State guar-
antees, especially for small savings, and also through
the solidity afforded by a suitably regulated and su-
pervised financial system.
In conclusion, the acquisition of a dwelling is
usually the result of a private decision and reflects a
long-term effort based mainly on family saving. This
gives the family a leading role in the solution of
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housing problems. Since many sectors of the popula-
tion are unable to gain access to a dwelling solely on
the basis of their family savings and their capacity to
repay a long-term mortgage loan, DHS can also serve
to promote and reward a sustained saving effort.
With this in mind, it is necessary to incorporate and
maintain over time the requirement for prior saving
as a requisite for being eligible for DHS.
III
Latin American experience in the application
of direct housing subsidies
There are a number of Latin American countries
which have direct housing subsidy programmes
(Gonzáles Arrieta, ed., 1995). These instructive ex-
periences (in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salva-
dor, Uruguay and Paraguay) listed in order of their
length of past trajectory, will be summarized below
and their main features, achievements and limitations
will be noted in each case.
1. Chile
Chile is the pioneer in Latin America in the appli-
cation of a system of housing subsidies of this
type. In 1978 the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development (MINVU) began to use this system for
the lower middle sector (dwellings costing up to
US$ 13,300 at the time: now equivalent to
US$ 27,200), in place of the subsidies implicit in
the interest rates on mortgage loans or hidden in
the sale price of building sites or dwellings. MINVU
now operates a set of five housing programmes de-
signed to serve the whole population that it is de-
sired to aid. Each programme involves a direct
subsidy paid to the purchaser of a dwelling in the
form of a pre-announced non-repayable once-only
contribution granted by the State to each benefi-
ciary family that does not already own a dwelling.
The DHS form part of a tripartite system of housing
purchase finance: prior saving of the beneficiary
family, the direct subsidy, and a long-term mortgage
loan. The principles underlying these programmes
are the subsidiary role of the State, the targeting of
social expenditure, progressiveness, and the encour-
agement of saving.
MINVU grants DHS with resources from the pub-
lic budget. The direct subsidies may be given in ei-
ther a private or State-oriented form. The private
modality consists of an endorsable certificate given
to the beneficiary, who uses it to pay part of the cost
of the selected dwelling, with the value of the certifi-
cate being later collected from MINVU by the vendor
of the dwelling. In the State-oriented modality,
which is used only for lower-cost dwellings, MINVU
commissions the construction of the dwellings by
tender and applies the subsidy directly to their cost,
with the beneficiaries merely being informed of the
details of the operation.
Table 1 summarizes the conditions of the hous-
ing programmes with a direct subsidy from MINVU.
The eligibility requirements for the different
programmes do not establish any differentiation ac-
cording to applicants’ income: it is the applicants
themselves who enter a particular programme ac-
cording to their aspirations, preferences and willing-
ness to pay for a dwelling. The maximum values of
the dwellings covered by the programme, the mini-
mum saving requirements and the maximum subsi-
dies are expressed in Development Units (“UF”): a
unit of account whose value in pesos varies day by
day according to the variation in the Consumer Price
Index in the previous month.
The Progressive Housing Programme is de-
signed for families living in a state of indigence and
comprises two stages. The beneficiaries are selected
according to the number of points they obtain: the
lower their socioeconomic and housing status, the
larger their family group and the longer they have
been enrolled in the programme, the higher the num-
ber of points assigned to them. In this programme,
which only began to operate in 1990, under the
MINVU modality 100% of the subsidies approved are
paid out, but under the private modality 10% of the
persons granted subsidies do not make use of them
within the time limit of 21 months.
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TABLE 1
Chile: Values of housing, subsidies, saving and loans under the housing
programmes of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
(Values expressed in Development Units (UF))
Programme Maximum value Maximum Minimum Maximum loan Other features
of dwelling subsidy prior saving
Progressive 140 132 8 – Collective or individual
Dwelling, Stage 1 projects, carried out
privately or by SERVIU a
Progressive 70 18 5 47 Collective or individual
Dwelling, Stage 2 projects, carried out
privately
Basic Dwelling 230 (SERVIU) 140 10 (SERVIU) 80 (SERVIU) Collective or individual
400 (private) 20 (private) 100 (private) projects, carried out
privately or by SERVIU
Special Workers’ 400 90 40 Not more than Collective private projects
Programme 65% of price
of dwelling
Rural Housing 260 (individual 150 (with 5 (with building Collective or individual
Subsidy applications) building plot) plot) private projects
400 (collective 200 (in housing 10 (in housing
applications) groups) groups)
Unified Subsidy, 500 130-120-110 50 Up to 1,000 UF Collective or individual
Category I but not more private projects
than 75% of price
of dwelling
Unified Subsidy, 1,000 110-100-90 100 Up to 1,000 UF Collective or individual
Category II but not more than private projects
75% of price
of dwelling
Unified Subsidy, 1,500 90-80-70 150 Up to 1,000 UF Collective or individual
Category III but not more than private projects
75% of price
of dwelling
Urban Renewal Up to 500 200-190-180 50 Optional Collective or individual
500 - 1,000 (all categories) 100 private projects
1,000 - 1,500 150
Leasing of Same categories 130 (Category I) Methodical – Individual private projects
dwellings as the Unified 110 (Category II) deposits of rent
Subsidy 90 (Category III) and of final
payment
Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU).
a SERVIU = Department of Housing and Urban Development.
The Basic Dwellings Programme is aimed at
families living in marginal housing conditions. In or-
der to receive the benefits, applicants must have a
certain level of prior saving and are selected accord-
ing to the points system described above. This
programme began to operate in 1984; the dwellings
were constructed under the State-oriented modality
(by tender) up to 1994, when the private modality
was introduced. By definition, 100% of the subsidies
approved are actually paid out. About 25,000 dwell-
ings per year are constructed under this programme
(almost 20% of the total number of dwellings built).
The Special Workers’ Programme (PET), which
was established in 1987, is aimed at organized groups
of families and provides improved basic dwellings. The
size of the subsidy given is smaller than in the follow-
ing programmes applicable to higher-cost dwellings,
since as there is no system of allocation on points it is
possible to receive a dwelling much more quickly.
The beneficiaries can apply to the banking system
for a supplementary mortgage loan, but the private
sector has not shown much interest in providing such
loans, probably because of their relatively small
amount, so MINVU guarantees access to a mortgage
loan of up to 65% of the cost of the dwelling, sup-
plied by the State-owned Banco del Estado. These
loans are issued in the form of mortgage bills, which
usually have a value below their nominal value when
traded on the capital market. All or part of the differ-
ence is covered by MINVU, thus representing an addi-
tional subsidy with a current upper limit of about
US$ 2,600 per operation.2 Some 16,000 dwellings
are financed each year through the PET, with 100% of
the subsidies actually being paid out.
The Rural Subsidy System is aimed at
low-income families living in localities with less
than 2,500 inhabitants. It requires prior saving in the
form of proof of ownership of a plot on which the
dwelling can be built. In this programme, the socio-
economic and housing situation of the applicants is
evaluated and the other criteria mentioned above are
also applied. Around 8,000 dwellings are constructed
each year under this programme, with over 90% of
the subsidies approved actually being paid out.
The Unified General Subsidy Programme is
aimed at middle- and lower middle-income families
who do not already own a dwelling but have a certain
level of payment capacity that makes them eligible
for bank loans. Under this system, the State subsi-
dizes part of the cost of the dwelling through a certif-
icate allocated under a non-personal application
system. In order to make the subsidy progressive, the
programme has three categories, depending on the
value of the dwelling it is desired to acquire, with
three forms of application: individual, collective, and
for areas of urban renewal. Applicants under this
programme are not ranked in socioeconomic terms
but must provide proof that they do not already own
another dwelling and that they have entered into a
saving plan with some financial institution. The cate-
gories of values of eligible dwellings, the corre-
sponding minimum prior savings required, and the
levels of subsidy that can be applied for are shown in
table 1.
The beneficiaries have a time limit of 21 months
for collecting their subsidies. The policy of MINVU
has been to guarantee a loan through the Banco del
Estado only for the first category of the programme.
As in the case of the PET, MINVU grants these debtors
an additional subsidy, with an upper limit of about
US$ 2,600 per operation, when the mortgage bills
have to be sold at less than their face value.3 Once
the dwelling is finished and it is transferred to the
purchaser by official deed of ownership, the vendor
of the dwelling can collect the value of the subsidy
–for which purpose he must submit the mortgage bill
to MINVU, endorsed in his favour– and the amount of
the prior saving. Under this programme, MINVU has
no direct involvement in the planning and execution
of the housing projects. It is now permissible to use
the subsidy to purchase a used dwelling, provided the
operation is effected in the last nine months of valid-
ity of the subsidy. Historically, over 80% of the sub-
sidies approved have actually been paid out. On
average, over 70% of the subsidies approved corre-
spond to category 1, over 20% to category 2, and less
than 7% to category 3.
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2 Initially, there was no upper limit on this implicit subsidy be-
cause it was desired to avoid situations where the beneficiary
might be exposed to market fluctuations which could prevent
him from making up the price of the dwelling, but in some cases
the additional implicit subsidy can be as much as twice the size
of the direct subsidy, thus militating against the progressiveness
of the system (Melo, 1995, p. 37).
3 When there was no upper limit for this implicit subsidy, there
were times when it was advantageous to apply for a loan even
without any direct subsidy merely in order to obtain the implicit
subsidy on the mortgage bills (Melo, 1995, p. 40). As from
1990, the maximum amount of the implicit subsidy was limited
to 80 UF per operation, and furthermore the loan eligible for the
implicit subsidy could not exceed 1,000 UF, in order to avoid or
reduce regressiveness of the system.
The subsidies paid in respect of private-sector
programmes, which include the Unified Subsidies,
the PET and the Rural Subsidies, number approxi-
mately 50,000 per year, and between 1980 and 1996
a total of almost 850,000 subsidies had been paid.
The subsidies in respect of the programmes for basic
and progressive dwellings, for their part, number
around 45,000 per year. Since some 120,000 dwell-
ings per year are built in Chile at present, this means
that the State plays a decisive part in the financing of
approximately 80% of all the dwellings built, in pro-
portions that range from 6% of the price for the
middle-income sectors to 94% for the very poor sec-
tors (Hermosilla, 1995, p. 21). In most cases (some
70%) direct intervention by the State is limited to
providing purchasing power through a direct subsidy
for demand granted through transparent and objec-
tive processes of reception and selection of applica-
tions. Thus, since 1992 Chile has been producing
more new dwellings than the demand generated an-
nually by the formation of new households and obso-
lescence of the existing stock of dwellings.
In short, in Chile the system of access to hous-
ing which incorporates DHS covers all the income
strata in a coherent manner, facilitating the access of
the neediest sectors of the population to formal (al-
beit somewhat rigid) solutions to their housing
needs, with the State playing a decisive role. The
success achieved in the application of DHS is also due
to the sustainability over time of the budgetary re-
sources earmarked for the provision of subsidies:
some US$ 400 million are currently set aside for
this purpose, of which over 92% corresponds to the
actual subsidies and less than 8% to administrative
expenses.
In the course of the operation of the system it
has been necessary to make some improvements in
order to secure greater efficiency and equity.4 One of
the main aspects that had to be improved was the tar-
geting of the subsidies (Castañeda, 1990), since the
programmes originally aimed at the lowest-income
strata mainly benefitted the middle-income sectors,
because the prior saving requirements were exces-
sively high, the investigation of the economic situa-
tion of applicants was not effective, and the
dwellings offered were relatively expensive. In view
of this, special programmes were introduced to serve
the middle and upper-middle income groups, while
the programmes designed for the poorest sectors
have sought to achieve a better balance between the
minimum prior saving required, the payment capac-
ity of the applicant, and the cost of the dwelling of-
fered.
The original Unified General Subsidy Programme
was also modified in various respects, such as the
housing cost categories, the quotas per region, the
amount of the subsidies, their period of validity, the
possibility of collective applications, etc. Recently
the Programme has been broadened to include direct
subsidies deferred in time, to be used with the new
system of renting dwellings with an undertaking for
their subsequent purchase (leasing), aimed at those
who wish to acquire a dwelling costing up to around
US$ 48,000. Under this modality, the State can either
grant a subsidy5 that MINVU pays out in successive
equal quarterly installments for up to 20 years, thus
reducing the burden on the beneficiary’s budget in
respect of the rent, or it can pay it out immediately so
that the beneficiary can buy a better and more expen-
sive dwelling.
The Chilean experience is also valuable because
it confirms in practice some of the advantages theo-
retically attributed to DHS: the granting of explicit di-
rect subsidies not only means greater transparency
but is also compatible with the principle of the sub-
sidiary role of the State and the functioning of a mar-
ket economy; the establishment of objective criteria
for the selection of applicants, subject to ongoing re-
view in the light of targeting criteria, guarantees the
credibility of the system; the stratification of the sub-
sidies by housing value categories makes it possible
to ensure the progressiveness of the system; the re-
quirement for methodical saving as a requisite for
obtaining the subsidy enhances the likelihood that
beneficiaries will subsequently be capable of servic-
ing a mortgage loan, as well as representing an im-
portant stimulus for family saving; and the
ACCESS TO HOUSING AND DIRECT HOUSING SUBSIDIES: SOME LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES • GERARDO M. GONZALES ARRIETA
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 9 • D E C E M B E R 1 9 9 9 149
4 An increase in efficiency has been noted, because in spite of
smaller fiscal expenditure it has been possible to mobilize more
resources to housing, much of the construction being carried out
by the private sector. There has also been a notable improve-
ment in equity: the proportion of subsidies going to the poorest
30% of the population has more than doubled, rising from 21%
in 1969 and 1980 to 50% in 1985-1986 (Castañeda, 1990, p. 176).
5 This system of leasing can also operate without a direct hous-
ing subsidy.
possibility of collective applications has the advan-
tage that a group form of organization tends to main-
tain itself in time and facilitate the fulfillment of its
individual members’ application commitments.
The work done in this field in Chile also shows
the need to overcome two major difficulties: on the
one hand, the limited willingness of the private sec-
tor to enter into the financing of low-cost dwellings,
which means that the public sector must play a pre-
ponderant role in this respect, and on the other, the
absence of a secondary market for low-cost dwell-
ings of the type covered by the subsidies. It is aimed
to promote such a market by permitting greater neu-
trality in the use of direct housing subsidies for either
new or used dwellings.
2. Costa Rica
In Costa Rica, the system of direct housing subsidies,
called “Family Housing Certificates”, has been in
operation since 1987 when the National Housing Fi-
nance System was set up. The State-owned Housing
Mortgage Bank administers these subsidies, which
are channelled with the backing of the Housing Sub-
sidy Fund. The Certificates are granted by the State,
on a once-only basis, to families with a monthly in-
come equivalent to less than four minimum monthly
wages of a skilled construction worker (a total of
some US$ 700). To begin with, the Certificates con-
sisted of a supplementary interest-free loan, but later
on they were changed into a non-repayable grant.
The Certificates are not actually delivered in the
form of a certificate but in the form of documents at-
testing to the technical characteristics of the dwelling
and the situation of the nuclear family receiving the
benefits. The origin of the Housing Subsidy Fund re-
sources applicable to the Certificates is laid down by
law and includes the levying of certain taxes and a
percentage of the national budget.
The maximum value of the Certificates cannot
exceed the equivalent of 30 times the minimum wage
mentioned earlier (i.e., some US$ 5,200). This maxi-
mum subsidy is given to families receiving an in-
come of up to one minimum wage and is currently
set at the equivalent of some US$ 4,800. In the case
of families receiving between one and four minimum
wages, the subsidy is granted on a partial basis in in-
verse proportion to the family income (table 2). As
the subsidies are calculated in steps of 20, there are
approximately 80 different amounts of subsidy, in
line with the small differences in family income.6
Since this maximum subsidy does not cover the max-
imum value of a normal low-cost dwelling (esti-
mated at around US$ 14,072), the subsidy is
accompanied by a 15-year mortgage loan granted by
authorized institutions. Since 1 April 1995, the inter-
est rate (which was previously fixed by the Housing
Subsidy Bank) is fixed freely by the institutions au-
thorized by the National Housing Finance System.
These authorized institutions classify the fami-
lies applying for subsidies and determine the maxi-
mum cost of the dwelling they wish to obtain, the
amount of credit to be extended, and the down pay-
ment required. The subsidy and the credit always go
together in a single package administered by the au-
thorized institution. The system only provides for in-
dividual applications. The Housing Mortgage Bank
is responsible for approving and paying out to the
authorized institution the amount of the subsidy for
the successful applicants, subject to verification of
the amounts determined by each institution.
The Family Housing Certificate programme in-
cludes various sub-programmes, and the subsidies
can be used to buy a new or used dwelling, to buy a
plot of land and build on it, to make improvements or
repairs to dwellings, to build a dwelling on a plot
belonging to the applicant and, more recently, to buy
a building site.
With the present values of the Certificates, in the
lowest-income category (i.e., up to one minimum
wage) the direct subsidy may cover at least
two-thirds of the cost of a basic housing solution, but
as the maximum cost of a normal low-cost dwelling
is estimated at US$ 14,072, in the case of that cate-
gory of applicants the subsidy only represents a very
low proportion (34%) of such a dwelling. The values
of the certificates can be readjusted by the Housing
Mortgage Bank up to a ceiling of 30 times the mini-
mum wage, but in Costa Rica there are no arrange-
ments for the automatic readjustment of the amounts
of the subsidies or of the cost of a dwelling for each
category. The authorities periodically raise the nomi-
nal amounts of the subsidies, but their real value usu-
ally lags behind inflation.
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6 In each case the calculation depends on the family income and
is carried out according to the following formula: value of
Family Housing Certificate = 1,394,000 - [336,000 x social
stratum], where the social stratum is the ratio between the gross
income of the family and the current minimum wage.
Unlike the Chilean system, the Costa Rican DHS
scheme does not make any requirement for the me-
thodical accumulation of prior saving in one of the
institutions authorized by the National Housing Fi-
nance System. The beneficiary’s contribution may be
made in the form of voluntary saving of a minimum
amount required for the basic loan, or through un-
skilled labour in a supervised self-build process.
Families whose income is not more than one mini-
mum wage are not obliged to make a down payment
or a minimum contribution. To back up the mortgage
loans granted, the National Housing Finance System
has made arrangements for the rediscounting of
Housing Mortgage Bank mortgages through the Na-
tional Housing Fund. It is estimated that so far 45%
of all the credit operations carried out by the Na-
tional Housing Finance System have involved Family
Housing Certificates.
From the establishment of the National Housing
Finance System up to September 1996, 118,727
housing subsidies worth a total of US$ 332 million
were granted, thus benefitting an equal number of
families with an income of up to four minimum
wages (approximately 18% of the population). Be-
tween 1990 and 1993, an average of 15,636 subsidies
were granted each year. Nearly 59% of all the subsi-
dies granted went to families living in rural areas
(Monge, 1995, p. 64). Out of the total number of
subsidies granted between the beginning of
operations and June 1995, 42% of the applications
approved were for the construction of a dwelling on
a plot already owned by the applicant, 31.5% were
for the acquisition of a building site and the con-
struction of a dwelling on it, 26% were for the pur-
chase of an existing dwelling, and 2% were for
repairs or improvements.7
According to official sources, the total amount
of resources allocated to the subsidy programme has
represented an average of approximately 3% of pub-
lic social expenditure since 1987. Over that period,
however, the Housing Mortgage Bank has not re-
ceived the whole of the resources laid down by law
(3% of the national budget): it is calculated that only
about 40% of that amount has actually been trans-
ferred to it.
Approximately 65% of the new dwellings built
and sold each year include a subsidy component.
Taking account of the subsidies granted and the
transactions completed outside the system, it is esti-
mated that in recent years it has been possible to pre-
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TABLE 2
Costa Rica: Calculation of Family Housing Certificate
and supplementary credit, by income brackets a
(In current dollars at 31 December 1996)
Minimum Maximum Maximum
Wage Gross Monthly Capacity for contribution Family Housing value of housing
stratum income installment indebtedness by beneficiary Certificate solution
– – – – – 4 802.5 4 802.5
0.50 86.5 26.0 1 132.4 – 4 802.5 5 935.0
1.00 173.0 51.9 2 264.9 – 4 802.5 7 067.4
1.50 259.5 77.9 3 397.3 169.9 4 039.9 7 607.1
2.00 346.0 103.8 4 529.8 226.5 3 277.3 8 033.6
2.50 432.5 129.8 5 662.2 283.1 2 514.8 8 460.1
3.00 519.1 155.7 6 794.6 339.7 1 752.2 8 886.5
3.50 605.6 181.7 7 927.1 396.4 989.6 9 313.0
4.00 692.1 207.6 9 059.5 453.0 227.0 9 739.4
Source: Housing Mortgage Bank (BANHVI).
a The calculations are based on the following parameters:
Repayment term: 180 months. Maximum subsidy: 1,058,000 colones (equals 27.8 minimum
Annual interest rate: 27%. wages).
Ratio of installment to income: 30%. Minimum subsidy: 50,000 colones (equals 1.3 minimum wages).
Minimum wage: 38,116 colones Exchange rate (interbank rate at 31 Dec. 1996): 220.30 colones
per dollar
7 The dollar figures for each year were calculated at the average
interbank exchange rate for each year.
vent an increase in the housing deficit. Since 1992,
for the first time, the number of dwellings financed
has covered the minimum annual needs and has
made it possible to begin to reduce the accumulated
deficit (Zawadzki, 1993, p. 24). Furthermore, the
Costa Rican DHS programme has proportionately fa-
voured the lowest-income groups: almost 79% of all
the subsidies granted have gone to families with an
income of not more than two minimum wages
(US$ 350). This targetting through direct subsidies
has been strengthened with time, since the proportion
of certificates actually paid out to the lowest-income
sectors rose from 65% in 1987 to 97% in 1996. Since
the mortgage loans are linked with the subsidy, this
also means that the mortgage credit provided by the
authorized institutions has also reached these sectors.
This is one of the most notable positive features of
the Costa Rican system, since in other countries
low-income beneficiaries of DHS have had great
difficulty in gaining access to mortgage loans.
The Family Housing Certificates are an instru-
ment which really has made it possible to increase
low-income families’ possibilities of gaining access
to housing. A family with an income equivalent to
three minimum wages which receives a DHS is thus
provided with a purchasing power that enables it to
obtain a dwelling that –without the subsidy– would
only be within the reach of a family with an income
of around four minimum wages. The certificates also
have a progressive income redistribution impact: the
lower the income level of a family, the higher the
amount of the subsidy it receives and the greater the
percentage increase in its purchasing power by this
means (Monge, 1995, pp. 64-65).
In addition to the direct subsidy, however, up to
1995 there was also an indirect subsidy through the
interest rates charged on the mortgage loans granted
by the authorized institutions. The decision taken in
April 1995 to free interest rates for the housing sec-
tor was designed to eliminate this indirect subsidy,
thus concentrating the government’s efforts on direct
assistance for the neediest and doing away with this
distortion in the functioning of the financial market
(Arroyo, 1995, p. 49). The establishment of a re-
quirement for methodical prior saving in order to ob-
tain a subsidy is also under consideration, since the
current absence of such a requirement is considered
to be one of the main shortcomings in the Costa
Rican DHS system. A requirement for prior saving
would also facilitate the objective allocation of subsi-
dies on a points system.
3. Colombia
In Colombia, the Family Housing Subsidy was estab-
lished in 1991. The bodies responsible for adminis-
tering and granting the subsidies are, in urban areas,
the National Low-Cost Housing and Urban Reform
Institute (INURBE) and the Family Welfare Agencies
and, in rural areas, the Agricultural, Industrial and
Mining Credit Agency. The design of the DHS sys-
tem in Colombia is particularly complex (there are
various institutions involved in the granting of such
subsidies and multiple scales of maximum values of
dwellings and subsidies), and furthermore it has un-
dergone numerous changes since its introduction.
The Family Housing Subsidy is a once-only
non-repayable contribution by the State in money or
kind (land, building materials, ownership deeds,
etc.). It is intended for households with an income of
not more than four legal minimum wages, currently
equivalent to a total of about US$ 568. The benefi-
ciaries can choose for themselves the housing solu-
tion for which they aim to use the subsidy. When in
the form of money, the subsidy is given to the body
or person who provided or financed the housing so-
lution of the beneficiary, against presentation of the
certificate of sale or improvement. Subsidies are
also provided in kind, either in the form of building
plots belonging to INURBE or the title deeds to a
considerable number of lots which were invaded be-
fore 1989. The traditional source of finance for the
DHS programme is the regular central government
revenue.
Beneficiaries must make a prior contribution in
money or kind. Applications can be collective as
well as individual. Beneficiaries are selected on the
basis of a household qualification process and a
points system, taking into account such criteria as
family income, the value of the housing solution, the
size of the prior contribution, the number of depend-
ants in the family, etc. The subsidies must be used
within 18 months of their award.
The DHS system has two branches: the first,
which forms part of the Social Solidarity Network, is
aimed at households with a monthly income of not
more than two legal minimum wages (about
US$ 284), while the second is intended to provide
new dwellings for households with an income be-
tween two and four minimum wages (about
US$ 568). The first-named branch is further divided
into two programmes: a programme for the improve-
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ment of dwellings and their environment, including
the legal accreditation of the title deeds of dwellings,
and a programme for the provision of new dwellings.
The maximum values of the low-cost dwellings
for which the DHS can be used are expressed in
monthly legal minimum wages, are readjusted once a
year, and are determined as a function of the popula-
tion size of the cities where they are located and the
monthly income of the beneficiary family: for fami-
lies with an income of up to two minimum wages,
the maximum value of the dwelling is equivalent to
about US$ 12,800, while for families with an income
of between two and four minimum wages the maxi-
mum value is equal to US$ 19,200. Table 3 shows
the maximum amounts of the subsidies, which are
expressed in Constant Purchasing Power Units
(UPAC) 8 and depend on the socioeconomic situation
of the beneficiaries, the type and value of the housing
solution selected, and the population of the city
where it is located.
In order to receive a DHS, beneficiaries must
make a certain minimum contribution. The mortgage
loans available are complementary to the subsidy and
are generally used by households with an income be-
tween two and four legal minimum wages. Generally
speaking, for this segment of families the subsidy,
plus the families’ contribution in money, cover 30%
of the value of the dwelling and the remainder is fi-
nanced with a 15-year mortgage loan.
From the inception of the DHS programme up to
September 1996, INURBE, which accounts for almost
half the subsidies granted in the country, approved a
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TABLE 3
Colombia: Maximum amounts of Family Housing Subsidy,
by mode of use and population of area where dwelling is located
(Figures in dollars and Constant Purchasing Power Units (UPACs)
Population of area where dwelling is located
(number of inhabitants)
Type of housing solution/institution granting subsidy
< 100,000 100,000 - 500,000 >500,000
A. For households with an income of not more than two legal minimum wages
Integral improvement of dwelling and environment US$ 2,058 US$ 2,058 US$ 2,058
(INURBE only) (210 UPAC) (210 UPAC) (210 UPAC)
Construction of dwelling on own site and improvement US$ 2,450 US$ 2,450 US$ 2,450
of dwelling (INURBE and Family Welfare Agencies) (250 UPAC) (250 UPAC) (250 UPAC)
or integral improvement of dwelling and environment
(Family Welfare Agencies)
Acquisition or acquisition and construction of basic unit, basic US$ 2,450 US$ 2,940 US$ 3,430
unit for progressive development or minimum dwelling (INURBE) (250 UPAC) (300 UPAC) (350 UPAC)
Acquisition or acquisition and construction of basic unit, US$ 3,430 US$ 3,920 US$ 4,410
basic unit for progressive development or minimum (350 UPAC) (400 UPAC) (450 UPAC)
dwelling (Family Welfare Agencies)
B. For households with an income between two and four legal minimum wages
Improvement of dwelling or construction on own site US$ 2,058 US$ 2,058 US$ 2,058
(210 UPAC) (210 UPAC) (210 UPAC)
Acquisition or acquisition and construction of basic unit, US$ 2,058 US$ 2,450 US$ 2,940
basic unit for progressive development or minimum dwelling (210 UPAC) (250 UPAC) (300 UPAC)
Source: National Low-Cost Housing and Urban Reform Institute (INURBE).
8 This is a unit established under Decree No. 1229 of 17 July
1972 as a mechanism for the monetary correction of savings and
loans in Savings and Loan Corporations. At first, it was laid
down that the peso equivalences of UPACs should be corrected
daily in line with the index of inflation, but after successive
changes in the manner of calculation of the readjustment the
value of the UPAC depends basically on the changes in the
market interest rate on deposits.
total of 270,932 subsidies, of which only 49% have
actually been paid out. For the provision of those
subsidies, US$ 486 million was earmarked and
US$ 226 million was actually disbursed (46.5%).
The proportion of effective disbursements of the sub-
sidy is thus very low compared with the number and
value of the subsidies approved.
The main uses of the DHS have been for the
purchase of building lots with services (32%) and
the improvement of existing dwellings (26%). The
financing of building lots has no longer been per-
mitted since 1994, as it was found that the granting
of a subsidy did not always guarantee that a dwell-
ing would be built. According to a study by the
National Centre for Construction Industry Studies
(CENAC), 90% of the dwellings technically classed
as low-cost attracted this benefit, which is a clear
indicator of the broad coverage of the programme.
Some 80% of the total number of direct housing
subsidies approved have gone to the population
segment with a family income of not more than
two legal minimum wages.
One of the main weaknesses in the Colombian
DHS programme, however, is the very small propor-
tion of the total cost of the dwelling covered by the
subsidy: if we take the maximum subsidy established
and the maximum permissible cost of the dwelling,
the subsidy only covers 27% of the cost of the hous-
ing solution in the case of the lowest income strata.
This situation, together with these groups’ limited ca-
pacity to save and to gain access to mortgage loans,
helps to explain the relatively high proportion (rather
more than a quarter) of subsidies approved but never
used. Furthermore, too much time elapses between
the approval of the subsidy and its actual disburse-
ment: the average length of time that an applicant has
to wait to actually receive the subsidy after its ap-
proval is 14 months. An evaluation of the programme
made by the authorities in 1994 (Salazar, 1995)
found a number of other problems, including the fact
that purchasers of dwellings with an income of 135
legal minimum wages have received subsidies with-
out of course needing them, and that the stratum with
an income between one and four minimum wages
does not have effective access to credit. In spite of
this, the changes which have been made have left
some very typical problems of the programme un-
touched, such as the low proportion of the price of
housing solutions covered by the subsidy, even for
the sectors with the lowest incomes.
4. El Salvador
In El Salvador, a DHS system was established in 1992
called the Contributions for Housing Programme, ad-
ministered and awarded by the National People’s
Housing Fund (FONAVIPO), which was set up in the
same year. The Contributions for Housing are State
contributions in cash or kind granted to the benefi-
ciary families on a once-only and non-repayable ba-
sis. In this case, the contribution is intended basically
for the improvement of dwellings and not for the
purchase of completed housing, which makes it
markedly different from the schemes operating in
Chile and Costa Rica. The contributions are granted
in the form of a certificate issued by FONAVIPO in fa-
vour of the beneficiary and negotiable only through
the institutions authorized to participate in the
Programme.
By law, the resources for the Programme are to
come from a special fund administered by FONAVIPO
and made up of the net assets of the former Urban
Housing Institute (IVU), which are to be administered
to turn them into cash. The law also authorizes
FONAVIPO to receive budgetary items from the central
government, although so far the Programme has not
obtained any funds in this way.
Beneficiaries must have a monthly family in-
come of not more than two minimum wages (cur-
rently US$ 264), their current dwelling must be
below the minimum acceptable housing conditions,
and they must own the building or site. Selection is
carried out on a points system whose basic compo-
nents are the effort made by the applicant, the value
of the housing solution, the length of time the appli-
cant has been in the system, and the family’s poverty
status.
The Programme currently operates under three
modalities: Individual Dwelling Improvement, New
Organized Settlements, and Credit for a New Dwell-
ing, with Contribution.9 The Individual Dwelling Im-
provement modality is aimed at families which own
a dwelling in poor conditions of habitability, or fami-
lies which own a plot of land and are living in a
makeshift dwelling. The New Organized Settlements
modality is aimed at families currently living in dan-
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9 Two more modalities are under consideration: Neighbourhood
Improvement, and Credit for Individual Dwelling Improvement,
with Contribution. The latter modality is aimed at families with
some capacity to repay a loan.
gerous areas, areas subject to expropriation, areas set
aside for tourism or nature reserves, or areas illegally
occupied by them, and who are willing to be moved
voluntarily to a plot of land which will belong to
them. The Credit for a New Dwelling, with Contri-
bution, is likewise aimed at families with an income
of not more than two minimum wages, but with the
difference that they do not own a dwelling or site of
their own. The above modalities allow the subsidies
to be used for the improvement or construction of a
dwelling, part payment for the purchase of a building
site (only 25% of the maximum subsidy can be used
in this manner), and the improvement of housing
and communal services. The Programme allows for
either individual or collective applications and leaves
it to the families to decide what aspect of their hous-
ing deficit they wish to cover.
The amount of the contribution is between four
and twelve minimum wages, depending on how pre-
carious the applicants’ housing conditions are. If we
compare the maximum value of the subsidy (about
US$ 1,584) with the estimated value of a dwelling
under the New Organized Settlements modality (be-
tween US$ 1,730 and US$ 1,950), we see that the
DHS covers 81% or more of the cost of the dwelling.
The values of the subsidies can only be changed in
line with changes in the urban minimum wage,
which is determined by the Ministry of the Economy.
The prior saving that families with an income of up
to one minimum wage and between one and two
minimum wages must fulfill is 8.33% and 15% of
their income, respectively. Under the New Organized
Settlements modality, the required family effort con-
sists of their willingness to be voluntarily transferred
from the dangerous or illegally occupied site where
they currently live to the new settlement where they
will own their dwelling. Under the Credit for a New
Dwelling, with Contribution modality, the mortgage
loan to make up the price of the dwelling is provided
by authorized institutions. Under this modality, it is
possible to acquire dwellings with a cost of up to
US$ 3,429; the corresponding credit can be up to
US$ 1,845 (53.8%) and the subsidy up to US$ 1,584
(46.2%).
From the date when it began operations up to
December 1996, the Contributions for Housing
Programme has approved nearly 27,000 housing sub-
sidies worth almost US$ 30 million. No funds have
been provided from the national budget for this pur-
pose, although the Law setting up FONAVIPO provides
for this. Since 1993, when 46% of the whole
Programme was achieved in terms of the number of
subsidies approved and 33% in terms of the value of
subsidies granted, there has been a marked slacken-
ing in the Programmes’s activities, mainly because
of the limited availability of resources. In its first
five years of operation, 60% of the resources dis-
bursed was for the improvement of existing dwell-
ings, while the remaining 40% was for the New
Organized Settlements modality, under which new
dwellings are built. It is estimated that 75% of the
subsidies granted went to families with an income of
less than half a legal minimum wage (currently
US$ 66), while the remaining 25% went to families
with an income of around one minimum wage
(currently US$ 132).
According to official sources, the Programme’s
contribution to the reduction of the housing deficit of
the lowest-income sector of the population has been
of the order of 6%. This should be interpreted in the
light of the fact that this scheme does not aim to pro-
vide a finished dwelling: its impact must be mea-
sured rather in terms of the gradual improvement of
the qualitative deficit affecting existing dwellings
(Bertrand, 1995).
5. Uruguay
In Uruguay, DHS are provided under the Integrated
System of Access to Housing (SIAV), which began in
1993. The Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning
and the Environment, set up in 1991, administers and
grants DHS. The SIAV was set up under the new hous-
ing policy initiated in 1991, backed up by a loan
from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
The DHS granted by the State to families with an in-
come equivalent to not more than 60 Readjustable
Units10 can take two forms: the provision of an Ex-
pandable Basic Nucleus (NBE), built by private sector
firms by tender, or the issue of a Direct Housing
Subsidy Certificate (CSHD).
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10 The Readjustable Unit (UR) is a unit of account created in
1968 under the National Housing Act (Law No. 13.728), and
its value is currently corrected monthly as a function of the
variation of the average wage index. As at 31 December 1996,
one UR was equivalent to 141.14 pesos (about US$ 16).
The DHS system is financed from the National
Housing and Urban Development Fund (FNVU), ad-
ministered by the Ministry of Housing, whose main
source of resources (almost 85% of the total) is a 1%
payroll tax.
In order to be eligible to apply for and receive a
subsidy under the SIAV, a family must fulfill two con-
ditions: it must be enrolled in the National Register
of Subsidy Applicants, which maintains updated in-
formation on the situation of the households con-
cerned, and it must have built up a certain level of
prior saving in the bank before the time limit set for
the period of application in question. At present, only
individual applications are permitted. The beneficia-
ries are selected on a points system based on two cri-
teria: first, the saving effort made and the length of
time the family has been saving, for which purpose
the number of Readjustable Units saved is multiplied
by a weighting factor which is an inverse function of
the socioeconomic level of the family, in order to in-
crease the probability that the poorest families will
be benefitted, and second, the size of the family unit.
The type of housing solution available and the
size of the subsidy that a family can obtain depend
on the latter’s monthly income. Families with the
lowest income levels are offered a housing solution
which is almost completely covered by the subsidy.
As families’ income levels rise, the higher is the
price of the housing solution open to them, the larger
the amount of prior saving required, and the smaller
the subsidy they will receive. All these values are ex-
pressed in URs. The size of the complementary
mortgage loan available is also directly related to the
family income level (table 4).
This stratification of demand means that for
families with an income of not more than 30 UR
(some US$ 480) the State can provide a subsidy
which covers almost the whole cost of the housing
solution open to the families in question (some
US$ 18,400); the remainder is covered by the re-
quired minimum prior saving. The certificate issued
to beneficiaries lasts for 18 months (non-renewable),
and can be used for the purchase of an Expandable
Basic Nucleus dwelling built by the private sector
under contract to the Ministry of Housing, the pur-
chase of a new or used dwelling on the open housing
market, the construction of a dwelling on the appli-
cant’s own site, or the acquisition of a building site
and the construction of a dwelling on it.
In the case of families with an income between
30 and 60 UR (between US$ 480 and US$ 960) there
are three different levels of subsidy, with the maxi-
mum subsidy representing a decreasing proportion of
the maximum price of the available dwellings as the
family’s income bracket rises. In these cases, the de-
sired housing solution is achieved by presenting, in
addition to the Direct Housing Subsidy Certificate, a
certain amount of prior saving and a mortgage loan
granted by one of the private or public financial in-
termediaries authorized to operate under the Inte-
grated System of Access to Housing, on terms freely
accorded between the applicant and the lender. The
dwellings corresponding to each income level, with
maximum prices laid down by law, are built by pri-
vate construction firms. The financial intermediaries
can rediscount both mortgage loans complementary
to the DHS and loans for financing the construction of
housing projects approved by the Ministry of
Housing, through the Rediscount Fund, which is also
financed with resources from the National Housing
and Urban Development Fund and is run as a
second-tier bank by the Central Bank of Uruguay.
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TABLE 4
Uruguay: Levels of income, subsidies, prior saving, loans and values
of dwellings under the Integrated System of Access to Housing
(In current dollars at end of December 1996)
Minimum Maximum Maximum value
Income level Subsidy level prior saving subsidy Maximum loan of dwelling
0-480 NBE a 80 18 320 – 18 400
480-705 I 1 040 12 000 9 360 22 400
705-865 II 2 640 9 120 13 840 25 600
865-960 III 5 950 5 980 16 870 28 800
Source: Ministry of Housing, Territorial Planning and the Environment.
a NBE = Expandable Basic Nucleus.
The Integrated System of Access to Housing
identifies families with an income over 60 RU (over
US$ 960) as suitable subjects for credit because of
their saving and repayment capacity, so families in
this sector have to make use of the market real estate
and financial schemes, including among the latter the
Mortgage Bank of Uruguay. The access of this sector
to housing depends exclusively on prior saving and a
mortgage loan on market terms.
In the first year of operation of the DHS system
(1993-1994), during which three invitations for ap-
plications were made, the Ministry of Housing issued
a total of 7,367 certificates, of which 68% corre-
sponded to certificates for the acquisition of Expand-
able Basic Nucleus dwellings and the remaining
32% to certificates for beneficiaries in levels I to III.
Bearing in mind that Uruguay is a small country,
this is quite a large number of subsidies for such a
short time, and it is estimated that it has made it pos-
sible to cover nearly 10% of the housing deficit
which existed.
The degree of targetting in this initial period was
quite satisfactory and ensured that the neediest sec-
tion of the population had the greatest probability of
receiving a benefit (Romay, 1995, pp. 128-129). The
families in a relatively easier position had to make
four times as great a saving effort as the poorest
households in order to receive benefits. Thus, the
households with the greatest housing needs saved
for an average of nine months, while those in a better
socioeconomic situation had to save for over 50
months in order to receive benefits.
Under this scheme, the Expandable Basic Nu-
cleus dwellings make possible a quicker housing
solution for a larger number of families, especially
the poorest ones, and they represent an important
advance in terms of the quality of life of the bene-
ficiary families, compared with the housing solu-
tions thrown up in makeshift settlements.
Furthermore, the DHS has helped to stimulate sav-
ing through the formal financial system (Romay,
1995, p. 149). Among the weaknesses of the
scheme are the fact that in practice the only finan-
cial institution that participates actively in the Inte-
grated System of Access to Housing is the
Mortgage Bank of Uruguay and that the DHS sys-
tem has not been capable of stimulating a signifi-
cant private supply of new low-cost dwellings, so
that many beneficiaries have used the subsidy to
buy used dwellings.
6. Paraguay
In Paraguay the Direct Housing Subsidy System has
been formally in operation since 1992, but its real
implementation began in 1995. This system was es-
tablished as part of the reordering of the housing sec-
tor carried out with the aid of two loans from the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The Na-
tional Housing Council (CONAVI), set up in 1990, is
responsible for administering the DHS system.
The DHS are a once-only non-repayable form of
direct State aid granted to beneficiary families in or-
der to enable them to purchase, build or improve a
low-cost dwelling. The subsidies are issued in the
form of a certificate which lasts for 18 months from
its date of issue and is transferred by beneficiaries to
the builder of the dwelling in part payment for the
latter. CONAVI pays out the certificates to vendors of
dwellings or to beneficiaries who are building on
their own sites.
In order to implement the system, two funds
were set up, both administered by CONAVI: the Direct
Housing Subsidy Fund, and the Mortgage Rediscount
Fund, through which CONAVI rediscounts the mort-
gage loans granted to beneficiaries by the financial
intermediaries. These intermediaries are any banking
or financial institution regulated by the Central Bank
of Paraguay or by the National Housing Bank, as ap-
propriate, or any legally constituted cooperative au-
thorized by CONAVI. By law, the resources of the
Direct Housing Subsidy Fund can come from general
budget items, domestic and foreign loans, etc.
Beneficiaries must make a prior contribution,
which can consist of savings, a building site of
their own, labour, or any other form of contribution
laid down by CONAVI. In the case of savings, the
applicant must have an account in one of the inter-
mediaries that participate in the programme. Ap-
plicants must have a family income which does not
exceed the maximum for each level of subsidy, as
laid down in the established stratification, and they
must not already own a dwelling. Only individual
applications are allowed. The selection of benefi-
ciaries takes account of the level of subsidy re-
quested and the geographical area where the
desired dwelling is located; the final selection is
based on a points system which takes into account
such criteria as the amount of prior saving, the
length of time the applicant has been saving, and
the size of the family group.
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The subsidies granted can be used in either of
two subprogrammes: the Housing Solution Acquisi-
tion Programme, which covers the purchase of new
or used dwellings, and the Own Site Housing Solu-
tion Programme, which covers the construction, ex-
pansion or repair of dwellings. The Paraguayan DHS
system has five levels of subsidies, depending on ap-
plicants’ income, with each level being divided into
the above-mentioned subprogrammes. Each of the
five levels is subject to maximum levels of dwelling
price and subsidy, minimum levels of prior saving,
and maximum levels of mortgage credit, when this is
required (table 5). These values are fixed in Mini-
mum Wage Units.11
As may be noted from the foregoing, the system
is progressive, not only in that the smaller the family
income, the larger the subsidy and the smaller the
prior saving required in absolute terms, but also in
that the subsidy represents a larger proportion of the
maximum cost of the dwelling. The DHS cannot ex-
ceed 75% of the cost of the dwelling. The system
provides for the possibility of a mortgage loan to
beneficiaries, at a variable interest rate, to make up
the total cost of the dwelling. The repayment install-
ments are adjusted automatically in line with the
Minimum Wage Unit, and possible discrepancies be-
tween these two indexes will be reflected in the re-
payment periods.
From the inception of the system in September
1995 to November 1996 there were five invitations
for applications and a total of 7,541 subsidies were
approved, of which the equivalent of 16% was actu-
ally paid out. A total of US$ 32.7 million was ear-
marked for the payment of this number of subsidies,
but only US$ 5.8 million was actually paid out (only
18% of the earmarked amount). Of the subsidies ap-
proved, 85% corresponded to the Housing Solution
Acquisition subprogramme, while the remaining
15% went to the Own Site Housing Solution
subprogramme. It should be noted that 60% of the
subsidies went to families with an income of not
more than 1.6 Minimum Wage Units (about
US$ 366), while the remaining 40% went to families
with an income between US$ 366 and US$ 1,053.
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11 The Minimum Wage Unit is a unit of account established un-
der Law No. 118/90. Its value, which is fixed by the competent
authority, varies according to the variation of the current mini-
mum monthly wage in the capital of the Republic for workers in
various unskilled activities. In December 1996 one Minimum
Wage Unit was equivalent to US$ 229.
TABLE 5
Paraguay: Levels of income, subsidies, prior saving, loans and
maximum value of dwellings under the direct housing subsidy system
(In dollars at the December 1996 exchange rate)
Monthly Direct Minimum Maximum Maximum Valuation for Valuation for
Level of subsidy family subsidy prior saving loan value of construction expansion or
income dwelling rehabilitation
I 779-1 053 2 748 1 832 15 114 19 694 7 878 13 786
II 573-779 3 435 1 145 10 763 15 343 6 137 10 740
III 366-573 4 122 687 7 099 11 908 4 763 8 336
IV 229-366 4 809 229 4 351 9 389 3 756 6 572
V Up to 229 5 496 115 1 832 7 328 2 931 5 130
Source: National Housing Council (CONAVI).
IV
Some lessons from the Latin American
experience, and policy recommendations
The two preceding sections make it clear, both in
theory and practice, how radically Direct Housing
Subsidies differ from traditional subsidies (such as
housing loans at subsidized interest rates and subsi-
dized dwelling prices) and how great their advan-
tages are in terms of equity, efficacy of the fiscal
effort and efficient operation of the financial system.
Having made those aspects clear, we will now out-
line some of the conditions and characteristics that
should exist in order for the use of DHS to give good
results.
1. Conditions needed for the successful
application of direct housing subsidies
In order to apply a DHS system successfully it is
necessary to place these subsidies in their proper
perspective, as part of housing policy and as a
means of giving the lower-income population ac-
cess to housing.
i) The aim of DHS, with the subsidiary interven-
tion of the State, is to give the lower-income popula-
tion access to the opportunities generated by a
market sectoral development model. They are there-
fore totally divorced from a common myth lying at
the basis of housing policies: that housing is a right.
If the latter idea is accepted, then it would be neces-
sary to identify exactly who should be obliged to
provide housing, and it would naturally appear that
this should be the obligation of the State. However, it
would obviously be impossible for the State to com-
ply with this assumed obligation, and any effort to do
so would involve the implementation of projects by
the State which would minimize the efforts made in
this direction by families themselves: an approach
which is diametrically opposed to that fostered by di-
rect housing subsidies. What the State is really under
the obligation to do is to guarantee that all families
have equal access to the opportunities offered by the
market, whatever their economic situation, but on
condition that the families make an effort them-
selves, which would be suitably rewarded.
ii) Direct housing subsidies should form part of
a housing policy designed to do away with two mis-
taken approaches of the past: first, that the housing
sector is a social sector, and second, that the housing
problem can be solved by promoting massive hous-
ing construction projects. The housing sector un-
doubtedly does involve a problem with obvious
social connotations, and the technical aspects are of
considerable importance, but such approaches lead to
the design of measures which prevent the sector from
making use of economic resources in competition
with other economic activities, since they scare off
private investment, eliminate the possibilities of
long-term finance and condemn the sector to a drasti-
cally reduced level of activity. DHS, in contrast, make
possible a form of State intervention which creates
spaces for the market economy and private invest-
ment, so that resources will flow into the sector.
iii) DHS should be an integral part of a compre-
hensive housing policy, not an isolated mechanism.
This means, first, that the sectoral development
model should be compatible with the general eco-
nomic and social development model; second, that
the housing policy should take account of the differ-
ent needs and possibilities of all sectors of the popu-
lation, in order to generate the right instruments
(with their corresponding resources) for taking care
of each of them; and third, that the housing policy
should recognize the unavoidable need for State in-
tervention but should at the same time promote pri-
vate sector participation by creating conditions of
profitability, competition and stability that will allow
that sector to act as an executing agent, invest re-
sources and assume risks.
iv) DHS can only make an effective contribution
to reducing the housing deficit if saving and
long-term mortgage loans for housing exist and are
developed, since these subsidies are essentially a
complementary and subsidiary means of gaining ac-
cess to a dwelling. In order for them to be applied
successfully, market conditions must prevail for fi-
nancial operations relating to the housing sector, so
that it is necessary to do away with all practices that
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lead to negative real interest rates on the housing fi-
nance markets. Interest rates are a key instrument for
promoting financial saving for housing, making pos-
sible the recovery of long-term mortgage loans at
their real value, and thus keeping alive financial in-
termediation for housing purposes.
v) Although DHS represent a special effort on the
part of the State to give preferential attention to the low-
est-income sectors, their application should not mean ne-
glecting finance options for the higher income groups.
The absence of such options would probably cause inter-
mediate groups who do not have access to suitable op-
portunities to try to take advantage of the benefits
designed for lower-income groups, crowding the latter
out and leading to a deterioration in the targetting of fis-
cal resources. If groups with a certain amount of pay-
ment capacity find suitable options in the market, this
will reduce the proportion of the population that need to
be aided from the limited resources of the State.
vi) DHS are only one of the mechanisms re-
quired in order to take care of the housing needs of
the lower-income population. Other complementary
instruments are also required, such as the issue of
legal proof of ownership for informal properties, in
order to give informal dwellings commercial value
and turn them into satisfactory collateral for mort-
gage loans, and the use of housing access mecha-
nisms for informal sectors which are in a position to
take on some long-term repayment obligations but
cannot provide proof of a steady income.
vii) The benefits expected from DHS can materi-
alize provided two basic conditions are fulfilled:
sustainability of the necessary resources and credibil-
ity of the system. DHS require fiscal resources which
are generally limited; consequently, once a
programme of this type has been initiated it is impor-
tant that it can be sustained in time in order to give
stability to the demand for housing and allow private
investment to develop its long-term capacity to pro-
vide dwellings in a competitive manner. It would be
quite pointless to set in motion a DHS programme
which creates expectations among potential benefi-
ciaries and private investors but subsequently has to
be deactivated because the resources have run out. At
the same time, the system must win credibility: its
operation must stimulate the functioning of the
markets and must not involve any favouritism, so that
it must use only procedures and criteria which are
totally transparent and objective and hence leave no
room for political manipulation.
2. Desirable features of direct housing
subsidies
In the light of the experience of the different coun-
tries summarized above, DHS should have certain
characteristics which will contribute to their efficacy
and efficiency (duly adapted to the actual conditions
of the area where they are to be applied, of course):
i) They should constitute a form of direct State
aid designed to create purchasing power to acquire a
housing solution: that is to say, they aid the demand
for housing, not supply. This feature means that the
subsidiary intervention of the State will be suitably
targetted and not indiscriminate, thus making it pos-
sible to effectively aid the target population. It will
also make it possible to attract private enterprise into
the housing sector rather than driving it out, since it
will not introduce price distortions into the real estate
and housing finance markets.
ii) They should be non-repayable, thus recog-
nizing that without such subsidies low-income fami-
lies will not be able to acquire a dwelling solely on
the basis of the opportunities provided by the market.
Their non-repayable nature also saves the State the
administrative costs inherent in any efforts to recover
outlays. In actual fact, these outlays will largely re-
turn to the State through the greater tax revenue de-
riving from the direct and indirect impact of
increased activity in the housing sector.
iii) They should be granted only once in the
lifetime of families, which should not already be
owners of a dwelling. DHS will thus be an expression
of the supportive aid of the State and society for
families in the poorest sectors of the population who
are willing to make an effort, within their possibili-
ties, to obtain a housing solution.
iv) They should be a complement to, and not a
replacement for, the families’ possibilities of saving
and indebtedness, especially in the case of the
lowest-income sectors. The efficacy of the subsidies
will depend to a large extent on the existence and ex-
pansion of saving and mortgage loans. As some of
the case studies show, the possibility of obtaining a
mortgage loan to make up the cost of the dwelling
has often been a decisive factor in enabling benefi-
ciaries of the subsidy to make effective use of it. The
case of Costa Rica shows the desirability of DHS
being linked with a mortgage loan, whereas the case
of Colombia highlights the disadvantages of a situa-
tion where the beneficiaries of subsidies cannot gain
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effective access to a mortgage loan, so that the effec-
tive use made of the subsidies approved is relatively
low. The rediscounting of mortgages may be useful
for helping the State to promote greater participation
of private financial institutions in the granting of
long-term mortgage loans to DHS beneficiaries, by
giving faster rotation and greater liquidity to the re-
sources loaned. One of the main problems that needs
to be solved in many countries is the limited partici-
pation of the private financial sector in the provision
of small housing loans.
v) They should be based on the use of clearly
measurable public resources, since among other ad-
vantages this helps to give a clear perception of the
efforts being made by the State in providing aid
targetted on the poorest sectors. It is highly desirable
that DHS should be financed from a budget item
which does not make any distinctions as regards the
source of the funds: in this way, the sustainability of
the system will depend essentially on the soundness
of the public finances of the country in question. Fur-
thermore, their dependence on the public budget will
introduce an important incentive for the efficient
management of the outlays in question, since each
year this will be a key element in the analysis of how
the use made of these resources compares with
public expenditure in other sectors.
vi) The amounts of the subsidies must be made
clear to those receiving them, so as to create a full
awareness among beneficiaries of the aid they are re-
ceiving from the State: something which is not al-
ways possible when State aid takes the form of
hidden subsidies. Therefore, subsidies should be
given in the form of actual funds (or their equivalent,
such as the certificates used in some countries), thus
promoting the free choice of a dwelling by the bene-
ficiary families. When the aim is to aid the very
poorest sectors, and the State is compelled to actu-
ally build dwellings for them, or when the subsidy is
practically equivalent to the price of the dwelling, the
State should invite tenders for the private sector to
build the dwellings directly. The limited response of
the private sector to the stimulus of DHS in terms of
providing low-cost dwellings is another problem
which needs to be solved in some countries.
vii) The subsidies should be of different
amounts, in line with an established scale, as a func-
tion of the applicant’s income and the cost of the
dwelling, with priority being given to progressive-
ness (i.e., the lower the applicant’s income and the
lower the cost of the dwelling, the higher the sub-
sidy), so that State aid to the poorest sectors is not
only proportionately greater compared with the cost
of the housing solution but is also greater in absolute
terms. It is also desirable that the values of the subsi-
dies should be expressed in units of account which
determine their variation over time, especially in line
with inflation, as this would make their discretionary
readjustment unnecessary and protect their real value
against inflation. In practice, it may prove to be
somewhat complex and costly to target State aid
properly on the poorest groups. Experience shows
that the use of income as a key variable for determin-
ing this objective can involve considerable margins
of error, so it would be desirable to take into account
other items of reference, as a number of countries
have done. Firstly –especially in systems designed to
provide initial housing solutions rather than finished
dwellings for the lowest income strata– a more ob-
jective targetting criterion would be the current
shortcomings in the dwelling that it is desired to im-
prove with the subsidy. Secondly, scales could be es-
tablished which link such variables as income, cost
of the dwelling, maximum subsidy and minimum
prior saving, and limits could be established for the
standards of dwellings that applicants can aspire to,
according to their economic possibilities: this would
also help to promote self-discrimination among the
applicants, as it is unlikely that a family would apply
for a lower-cost dwelling simply in order to obtain a
larger subsidy if its economic possibilities were such
as to permit it to obtain a more expensive dwelling
(this hypothesis is strengthened by the very low level
of housing mobility in the countries of the region).
Thirdly, prior saving –as an objective means of mea-
suring the effort made by families to attain a subsidy
and a housing solution– may be given decisive
weight in targetting (as in the case of Chile), while
giving due weight to the fact that the lowest-income
families have less capacity to save and thus placing
them on an equal footing for competing with
higher-income families (as in the case of Uruguay).
viii) They should be administered through trans-
parent procedures which are fully known and under-
stood by applicants, beneficiaries and the public at
large. The criteria for selecting the beneficiaries
should be objective: they should be based on measur-
able and impersonal factors (as for example through
a points system), and should be free from all kinds of
discretionality. The credibility of the DHS system,
and hence its permanence in time and its effective-
ness for dealing with the needs of the poorest sectors,
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will directly depend on the transparency of the pro-
cedures and the objectivity of the criteria for select-
ing the beneficiaries, which should rule out all
possibility of political favouritism or influences
which will discredit the system and endanger its sur-
vival. The ongoing improvement of this transparency
and objectivity should be a constant part of the ef-
forts to secure better targetting of DHS; the norms
applied and the results obtained should be evaluated
periodically and, if necessary, suitable changes
should be made.
ix) In awarding the subsidies, emphasis should
be placed on the requirement for methodical prior
saving. Such saving is not only a reflection of the ef-
fort made by families to attain a housing solution but
should also be an objective criterion in the allocation
of subsidies (points should be given for the amount
and length of prior saving, for example, among other
factors). This will encourage families to be active
participants in their search for a housing solution and
not mere passive recipients of State handouts. In the
cases studied, all the countries except one consider
prior saving or some expression of family effort to be
an essential requirement for seeking and obtaining a
subsidy. In order to prevent the prior saving require-
ment from prejudicing the poorest families, there are
procedures for putting them on an equal footing with
higher-income families. Furthermore, the prior sav-
ing of lower-income applicants can also be expressed
in kind (building plots, for example). Indeed, El Sal-
vador has adopted an even broader interpretation of
“prior saving”: under the DHS system applied there,
credit is given for the sacrifices involved in a poor
family’s willingness to leave a marginal area where
they are living and move to a more orderly settlement
where, however, they will have to rebuild their eco-
nomic relations. Another substantial argument for
making prior saving a requisite for obtaining a sub-
sidy is that it strongly encourages an increase in the
amount of savings channelled through the financial
system.
x) It is necessary to define whether the DHS is to
be used for acquiring a finished dwelling, obtaining
an initial (expandable) housing solution, or improv-
ing an existing dwelling, and whether there should be
a process of gradual improvement of the dwelling as
a function of the economic possibilities of the benefi-
ciaries. A key element in taking the final decision
will be the source and amount of the resources avail-
able for the provision of subsidies. At all events,
when the subsidy is to be used in the acquisition of
finished dwellings it is important that the proportion
of the total price of the dwelling covered by it should
be sufficiently large to ensure that the subsidies ap-
proved are actually used. The provision of initial
housing solutions that can subsequently be improved
and expanded may also be a very useful approach,
especially for the lowest-income sectors: as well as
requiring fewer resources, the standard of these
dwellings will be in keeping with the beneficiaries’
real economic possibilities and priorities, thus avoid-
ing later difficulties in maintaining the dwellings and
continuing with their gradual improvement.
It will also be important to define whether DHS
can only be used for the acquisition of new finished
dwellings or whether they can also be used to buy
a second-hand dwelling. If the latter is possible, this
can substantially help in the formation of a second-
ary housing market for the low-income groups, mak-
ing it easier for families who already own a dwelling
and whose income has increased to sell their used
dwelling in order to acquire another one which is
better and more expensive. Since a very high per-
centage of the total housing stock of a country are
used dwellings, authorization to use the subsidies to
acquire either new or used dwellings would allow the
lower-income sectors to begin their process of ob-
taining their own dwelling by purchasing low-cost
used housing. This approach has recently been intro-
duced in Chile, where the subsidies were previously
for the acquisition of new finished dwellings.
Another important lesson to be drawn from the
case studies is the desirability of encouraging col-
lective, and not only individual, applications for
DHS. At least for the lowest-income population,
this would seem to be useful for two reasons: on
the one hand, it promotes the participation of bod-
ies that further the organization of the demand for
housing and thus improve the possibilities and ca-
pabilities of the population involved in the process
of applying for subsidies, and on the other hand, it
brings about more effective utilization of the subsi-
dies, since the process of seeking a housing solu-
tion through these benefits and/or mortgage loans
needed to make up the cost of the dwelling is
strengthened by specialized, organized technical
support which helps to put the applicants for
dwellings or housing credit on a more equal foot-
ing with the respective suppliers.
(Original: Spanish)
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